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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. The Plaintiff/Appellant is Michael C. Posner (referred to herein as 
"Posner"). 
2. Defendant/Appellee Equity Title Insurance Agency, Inc. (referred to herein 
as "Equity Title") was a defendant below. The trial court granted summary judgment to 
Equity Title on May 23, 2005, which Posner appealed. 
3. Defendant Independence Title Insurance Agency (referred to herein as 
"Independence Title") was a defendant below. The trial court granted summary judgment 
to Independence Title on May 23, 2005. Posner did not appeal said judgment. 
Independence Title is not a party to this appeal. 
4. Defendant/Appellee NRT, Inc., d/b/a Coldwell Banker Residential 
Brokerage (referred to herein as "Coldwell Banker") was a defendant below. The trial 
court granted summary judgment to Coldwell Banker on December 8,2008, which Posner 
appealed.1 
1
 The Brief of Appellant incorrectly states that Coldwell Banker is not a party to 
this appeal. (App. Br., p. I). 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of this matter under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). The Supreme Court transferred this matter to the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The statutes, rules and regulations which pertain to this appeal are identified in the 
Table of Authorities and are fully set forth in the body of this brief. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Coldwell Banker is satisfied with Posner's statement of the issues presented for 
review (as they relate to Coldwell Banker), and Posner's statement of the standard of 
review for those issues. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Posner commenced this lawsuit on or about January 30, 2004. R. 1. 
2. The trial court entered the original Scheduling Order governing formal 
discovery in this case on or about July 30, 2004. R. 91. 
3. On or about March 28,2005, Posner filed a First Amended Complaint which 
introduced a single claim of breach of fiduciary duty against Coldwell Banker. R. 323. 
4. On or about May 2,2006, the trial court entered a second Scheduling Order 
to govern formal discovery between Posner and Coldwell Banker. R. 91. 
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5. At Posner's request, the Trial Court later entered an Amended Scheduling 
Order on or about October 2, 2006. R. 872. 
6. The Amended Scheduling Order established the deadline for fact discovery 
as October 13, 2006. The deadline for expert witness designation was sixty days 
thereafter, or December 12, 2006. R. 872. 
7. Through interrogatories dated July 26, 2006, Coldwell Banker formally 
requested Posner to identify any and all expert witnesses he intended to call to testify 
during the course of this lawsuit. R. 719 and 728. 
8. Posner responded to the aforementioned interrogatories, but never identified 
or designated Gage Froerer in his response. Posner never supplemented his response to 
Coldwell Banker's interrogatories with either the designation or identification of Gage 
Froerer. R. 728. 
9. Posner filed an unsigned Rule 26(a)(3) Designation of Expert Witness Gage 
Froerer with the trial court on December 26, 2006. R. 1066. 
10. Following the expiration of all deadlines set forth in the Amended 
Scheduling Order and after an extended period of inactivity, the trial court ordered Posner 
to appear before it on January 10,2008, and show cause as to why this case should not be 
dismissed for Posner's failure to prosecute. R. 1515. 
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11. Despite months of inactivity, Posner appeared at the Order to Show Cause 
hearing and certified to the trial court that the case was immediately ready for trial. R. 
1525. 
12. Based upon Posner's certification of readiness for trial, the trial court did 
not dismiss the case. Instead, the trial court conducted a scheduling conference to 
determine the final pre-trial and trial schedule. R. 1519 and 1522. 
13. The case was scheduled for a three-day jury trial on June 17, 18 and 19 of 
2008. R. 1634. 
14. On or about March 13, 2008, Coldwell Banker filed a Motion in Limine to 
Exclude the Testimony and Report of Gage Froerer. R. 1527. 
15. On or about March 13,2008, Coldwell Banker also filed a Motion in Limine 
to Exclude Documents Produced by Plaintiff After the Expiration of the Fact Discovery 
Deadline. R. 1559. 
16. On or about May 28, 2008, the trial court entered its Order wherein it 
granted both of Coldwell Banker's Motions in Limine. R. 1695. 
17. On or about June 6, 2008, Coldwell Banker filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R. 1755. 
18. On or about December 8, 2008, the trial court entered the Order granting 
Coldwell Banker's Motion for Summary Judgment. In its Order, the trial court awarded 
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Coldwell Banker its attorney's fees and cost pursuant to Posner's contract with Coldwell 
Banker. R. 1842. 
19. In 2002, and at the outset of the transaction at issue, Posner and Coldwell 
Banker had entered into a Listing Agreement & Agency Disclosure (hereinafter "Listing 
Agreement"). Paragraph 8 of the Listing Agreement states: 
Except as provided in section 7 [mediation provision], in case of the 
employment of an attorney in any matter arising out of this Listing 
Agreement (including the sale of the Property) the prevailing party shall 
be entitled to receive from the other party all costs and reasonable 
attorney fees, whether the matter is resolved through court action or 
otherwise. 
(App. Br., Add. C). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Coldwell 
Banker as Posner could not have prevailed on his claim of breach of fiduciary duty 
as a matter of law. Posner had no expert to testify as to the appropriate standard 
of care to be applied to Coldwell Banker or to opine as to whether Coldwell 
Banker's conduct fell below the appropriate standard of care. Expert testimony 
was absolutely necessary in this case as it involved a complex and unusual closing 
which was not within the common knowledge or experience of a lay juror. 
Posner's expert testimony and report was properly excluded by the trial 
court as Posner willfully ignored the Amended Scheduling Order and frustrated the 
trial court's ability to manage this case. Allowing Posner's tardy designation of 
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Mr. Froerer would have resulted in significant waste and prejudiced both the trial 
court and Coldwell Banker. 
Early in the case, Coldwell Banker served Posner with interrogatories 
wherein Posner was requested to identify any and all experts he intended to call in 
this case. Posner made no mention of any experts in his responses to Coldwell 
Banker's interrogatories. Posner never supplemented those responses. In fact, 
over the course of two years of formal discovery and two separate, court-ordered 
mediations, Posner never designated or identified any additional expert. Indeed, 
it was not until after the expiration of both fact and expert discovery, after the 
failed mediations, and after Coldwell Banker had filed a cumulative motion for 
summary judgment that Posner finally, and belatedly, designated Mr. Froerer as an 
expert in this case. The trial court properly granted Coldwell Banker's motion to 
strike the expert report and testimony of Mr. Froerer. The trial court was justified 
in striking the expert testimony. 
The trial court struck Mr. Froerer's report and testimony because Posner 
never properly identified Mr. Froerer in his responses to Coldwell Banker's 
interrogatories and because Posner's expert designation of Mr. Froerer was 
admittedly two weeks tardy. However and more importantly, the trial struck 
Posner's expert report and testimony to sanction Posner's repeated and persistent 
dilatory conduct in this case. The trial court struck Posner's expert because 
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allowing Posner's late designation would have endorsed and legitimized Posner's 
persistent refusal to comply with the Amended Scheduling Order and other basic 
tenets of formal discovery, which Posner had so often ignored. Finally, the trial 
court struck Posner's expert in order to avoid the unfair prejudice that would have 
resulted had Posner been allowed to bend the rules yet again. 
The trial court's Order included the evidentiary findings upon which it 
granted Coldwell Banker's motion to exclude Mr. Froerer's report and testimony. 
The Order made reference to the underlying briefing and dismissed Posner's 
questionable contention regarding an earlier, albeit late, expert designation. In 
addition to reviewing the Order and the briefing referenced therein, this Court may 
look to the lower court record. The record clearly demonstrates that Posner's 
failure to comply with the Amended Scheduling Order and the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure was willful and that Posner's actions and inactions warranted the 
sanction meted out by the trial court. 
Finally, the trial court properly awarded Coldwell Banker its attorney's fees 
pursuant to the Listing Agreement. Although Posner's claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty sounded in tort, the parties' dealings and Posner's claim arose solely 
from the contract between the parties. But for the Listing Agreement, Posner 
would have no cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Accordingly, this 
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Court should affirm the trial court's award of attorney's fees and costs to Coldwell 
Banker. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
STRIKING THE REPORT AND TESTIMONY OF POSNER'S 
EXPERT. 
Sanctions are warranted when "(1) the party's behavior was willful; (2) the 
party has acted in bad faith; (3) the court can attribute some fault to the party; or 
(4) the party has engaged in persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the 
judicial process. (App. Br., p. 30, citing Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement Inc., 
199 P.3d 957, 965 (Utah 2008). Posner's failure to comply with the scheduling 
order in regard to the expert witness designation was willful and fault was properly 
attributed to Posner. 
A. The Sanction Was Warranted As Posner's Failure to Timely 
Designate His Expert Was Willful. 
The trial court entered an Amended Scheduling Order on or about October 
2,2006. R. 872. Pursuant to the Amended Scheduling Order, Posner was required 
to designate his expert witnesses and submit all related expert reports no later than 
December 12, 2006. Despite this clear and unambiguous deadline, Posner failed 
to timely identify or designate Mr. Froerer. 
This matter involved more than a two week late expert designation and must 
be reviewed in context with the history of the case. By December of 2006, the case 
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had been pending for nearly two years. Fact discovery was completed by October 
13, 2006. Following the expiration of fact discovery, both the trial court and 
Coldwell Banker reasonably believed that all material facts were discovered and 
exchanged, and that all potential witnesses had been designated. Believing that all 
triable issues and facts had been explored and set forth during the course of formal 
discovery, the trial court ordered the parties to renew their efforts to mediate. 
Mediation was ordered for a second time. R. 878. The parties mediated this matter 
for a second time on December 8, 2006. R. 1619. At no time prior to, or during 
the mediation did Posner reference, allege or represent that he had retained an 
expert in support of his claims against Coldwell Banker. Thus, Posner's failure to 
timely designate Mr. Froerer again frustrated the progress of the case and the 
purpose of the second mediation. 
Posner filed an unsigned Rule 26(a)(3) Designation of Gage Froerer and the 
related Expert Report on December 26, 2006. R. 1066. Posner filed the 
designation only after the failed mediation and after Coldwell Banker incurred 
significant costs to prepare and file its comprehensive motion for summary 
judgment. Posner's designation of Mr. Froerer undisputedly occurred two weeks 
after the expiration of the expert designation deadline. Prior to his tardy 
designation, Posner had roughly two years within which to appropriately identify 
and designate his witnesses. Moreover, through interrogatories as early as July, 
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2006, Coldwell Banker requested Posner to identify any expert he intended to call 
as an expert witness. R. 719 and 728. Posner made no mention of any expert in 
his discovery responses. R. 728. 
Before the trial court, Posner argued that the mediation order "effectively 
interrupted the 2006 [Amended Scheduling] Order." R. 1612. If Posner believed 
that the ordered mediation "interrupted" the Amended Scheduling Order, Posner 
should have addressed the same with the Court and opposing counsel. Prior to the 
mediation, the trial court judge held a telephone conference with the parties. R. 
878. Posner had every opportunity to address the dates contained in the Amended 
Scheduling Order and how the mediation may have impacted the deadlines set 
forth therein. However Posner never sought, nor obtained, leave of court to modify 
the Amended Scheduling Order or the expert designation deadline. Indeed, Posner 
maintained his silence. Posner made no mention whatsoever of any expert until 
well after the scheduling conference, the mediation, Coldwell Banker's summary 
judgment motion and the expiration of the expert designation deadline. 
This Court has made clear that "to support a finding of willfulness, there 
need only be any intentional failure as distinguished from involuntary compliance. 
No wrongful intent need be shown." Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West 
Development Inc.. 129 P.3d 287, 291 (Utah App. 2006). See also Tuck v. 
Godfrey, 981 P.2d 407, 411 (Utah App. 1999). As discussed above, Posner's 
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failure to file his expert designation was willful as he was fully aware of the 
Amended Scheduling Order and its expert discovery deadline. Posner wilfully 
chose not to comply with the Amended Scheduling Order. 
Moreover, in referring to the second mediation, Posner indicated in his brief 
that it did not "make sense to [Posner to] spend money on any steps towards 
litigation until we see the outcome of this mediation." (App. Br., p. 31). This 
statement shows that Posner made the wilful decision to ignore the Amended 
Scheduling Order and its expert designation deadline. This telling statement in 
Posner's brief further supports the trial court's finding of willfulness. 
B. The Sanction Was Warranted As The Trial Court Properly 
Attributed Fault To Posner For His Failure to Timely Designate 
His Expert. 
After Coldwell Banker filed its Motion to Strike the Expert Report, counsel 
for Posner claimed that she mailed the expert designation to Coldwell Banker on 
December 14,2006. (R. 1610). Coldwell Banker received no such letter or expert 
designation on or near that date. R. 1618. Posner's counsel offered only an 
unsigned, one page letter to support her assertion. R. 1617. Posner's counsel made 
no reference or production of any certificate of mailing or certificate of service to 
evidence the designation as there was none. The trial court and Coldwell Banker 
first received Posner's expert designation on December 26,2006, two weeks after 
the expiration of the expert designation and well after Posner's counsel claimed to 
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have mailed the mysterious one-page, unsigned letter. R. 1066. These dubious 
circumstances beg the question that if Posner had, in fact, timely designated Mr. 
Froerer on December 14, 2006, why would he wait an additional two weeks to 
actually file the same properly with the court. 
Posner's contention was further suspect as Posner previously designated a 
different expert in the case, which designation was in compliance with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 178). Posner previously designated Joseph A. 
Beykirch as an expert. Posner's designation of Mr. Beykirch appropriately 
included a certificate of mailing. It was certainly odd that counsel for Posner 
would present an unsigned letter as evidence of an expert witness designation in 
the same case in which she had appropriately made an earlier expert witness 
designation in compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The trial court properly found that there was insufficient evidence to support 
Posner' s contention of a timely or appropriate designation of Mr. Froerer. R. 1695. 
The judge noted that there was no certificate of service or certificate of mailing 
which accompanied the expert designation and report. Posner continues the 
suspect claim today by including a complete misrepresentation of the facts in his 
brief on appeal. The Brief of Appellant indicates that "Posner's counsel thought 
she was timely filing the expert witness designation when she served Coldwell 
Banker on December 14, 2006." (App. Br., p. 31 (emphasis added)). The trial 
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court's ruling and the Record in this case is absolutely clear that Coldwell Banker 
was never served with an expert witness designation on December 14, 2006. 
The trial court properly attributed fault to Posner for the improper and late 
designation of Mr. Froerer. Posner was at fault in not designating the expert prior 
to the ordered cut off date of December 12, 2006. If Posner indeed mailed the 
letter on December 14, 2006, Posner was at fault for not properly designating the 
expert in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If Posner indeed 
mailed the letter on December 14,2006, Posner was at fault for not filing an expert 
designation with the trial court until December 26, 2006. More significantly, 
Posner was at fault for failing to identify and designate his expert prior to the 
second mediation ordered by the trial court. 
Posner was also at fault for failing to supplement his discovery responses 
to Coldwell Banker and identify Mr. Froerer as a potential expert witness. In July, 
2006, Coldwell Banker requested Posner to identify any expert he intended to call 
as an expert witness. R. 719 and 728. Posner made no mention of any expert in 
his discovery responses. R. 728. Rule 26(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure makes clear that "A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior 
response to an interrogatory . . . if the party learns that the response is in some 
material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective 
information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the 
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discovery process or in writing." URCP 26(e)(2) (2008). According to the 
Affidavit of Mr. Froerer, Mr. Froerer consulted with Posner in early November, 
2006. R. 1685. Thus, Posner had adequate time to appropriately amend his 
discovery responses and advise Coldwell Banker of the potential expert witness. 
Posner was clearly at fault in failing to amend his discovery responses and failing 
to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in addition to his failure to 
comply with the Amended Scheduling Order. Again, we see the practical impact 
and frustration of the case from Posner5 s failure to timely designate his expert. 
C. The Trial Court's Order Includes the Proper Factual Findings 
to Merit the Sanction. 
Rather than include the many facts underlying the sanction, the Order 
incorporates by reference Coldwell Banker's Memorandum in Support of Motion 
in Limine to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Gage Froerer (hereinafter "Coldwell 
Banker's Memorandum in Support to Exclude Expert") and the arguments in 
support set forth therein. R. 1695. The Order indicates "For the reasons set forth 
in Coldwell Banker's Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude the 
Expert Testimony of Gage Froerer, Coldwell Banker has adequately satisfied its 
burden to demonstrate the prejudice it would suffer were this Court to allow Mr. 
Froerer's untimely testimony and report to be introduced at trial." It is common 
practice for the trial courts in Utah to incorporate findings into Orders by reference. 
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 70 P.3d 904, 910 (Utah 2003); 
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State v. L.A.W.. 12 P.3d 80, 84 (Utah 2000); Wilson v. Wilson. 2008 WL 
5097703, H 2 (Utah App. 2008), Jackson v. State. 2008 WL 152588, Tf 1 (Utah App. 
2008). 
Coldwell Banker's Memorandum in Support to Exclude Expert includes the 
evidentiary basis warranting the sanction. R. 1530. Posner's willfulness and fault 
in failing to comply is described therein. Coldwell Banker's Memorandum in 
Support to Exclude Expert notes that Posner failed to identify any potential expert, 
through discovery or timely designation, during the two years during which the 
case was pending. R. 1530. 
This Court may also include the trial court's oral ruling on the motion (R. 
1914) in its review. Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank West NA, 629 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (2009). The oral ruling outlines the untimeliness of the 
designation and notes that the dates for the jury trial had already been scheduled. 
R. 1914. The oral ruling also incorporates Coldwell Banker's Reply Memorandum 
in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Gage Froerer 
(hereinafter "Coldwell Banker's Reply Memorandum"). R. 1914. Coldwell 
Banker's Reply Memorandum addresses the real impact of Posner's late 
designation which was to frustrate the entire case. R. 1618. 
The Order also details the facts surrounding Posner's contention that the 
expert report was provided on December 14,2006. R. 1695. The Court notes that 
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there was insufficient evidence to support the contention which further 
demonstrates fault on the part of Posner thereby warranting the sanction. 
D. If This Court Finds The Trial Court's Order Lacking, the 
Record Reveals Sufficient Factual Grounds to Uphold the 
Sanction. 
This Court recognizes that a lower court's failure to make a specific finding 
of willfulness, bad faith or fault "is not grounds for reversal if a full understanding 
of the issues on appeal can nevertheless be determined by the appellate court." 
Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 962 (Utah App. 1989). 
See also Preston & Chambers. P.C. v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260, (Utah App. 1997). As 
discussed above, the evidence contained in the record in this case demonstrates 
Posner's willfulness and fault in regard to the expert designation. 
The striking of Posner's expert report was not due simply to his two week 
late designation but rather because of Posner's actions which greatly frustrated the 
case. Posner had two years to identify and disclose any potential witness. Not only 
did Posner fail to timely designate an expert, Posner failed to identify any expert 
in his discovery responses and failed to supplement the same. R. 719 and 728. 
Believing that the discovery process was complete, the trial judge ordered the 
parties to mediate the case for a second time before proceeding to trial. R. 878. 
Posner had numerous opportunities to advise Coldwell Banker and/or the trial 
judge that he intended to designate an expert witness. Instead, Posner presented 
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the expert designation after the mediation and after the designation cutoff. R. 
1066. Moreover, Posner tried to present an unsigned letter as evidence of an 
earlier, albeit late, expert designation at the hearing on the matter. R.1913 and 
1610. Thus, this Court can fully determine the issue from a review of the record 
should it find that the trial court failed to include the adequate findings in the 
Order. Any such failure by the trial court to not make a specific finding of 
willfulness or fault is not reversible error. 
E. The Sanction Was Just. 
Posner's omission and concealment of any potential expert witness 
prejudiced Coldwell Banker and frustrated the effective management and litigation 
of the case. Coldwell Banker reasonably formulated its defense based upon the 
facts, witnesses and information disclosed during the previous two years of formal 
discovery. Coldwell Banker relied upon Posner to comply with the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to seasonably supplement his discovery responses and to provide 
all material information during fact discovery and during mediation. Instead, 
Posner ambushed both Coldwell Banker and the trial court with his tardy and 
surprise expert witness designation filed together with his Memorandum in 
Opposition to Coldwell Banker's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Posner took absolutely no action in the case for nine months following the 
denial of Coldwell Banker's first Motion for Summary Judgment. Had Posner 
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actually taken any action to move his case forward during the year following his 
untimely expert designation, Coldwell Banker would have then moved to strike the 
improper expert testimony at that time. However, Posner allowed this case to 
stagnate for nearly a year, thereby giving e both Coldwell Banker and the trial court 
the impression that he had abandoned his case. The appearance of Posner's 
abandonment was so compelling that after nine months of inactivity, the trial court 
sua sponte ordered the parties to show cause as to why the case should not be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute. R. 1515. 
In order to avoid dismissal, counsel for Posner appeared at the order to show 
cause hearing and hastily represented that the case was ready for trial. Coldwell 
Banker's Motions in Limine naturally followed. The record clearly establishes that 
Posner was responsible for the significant delays in prosecution of this suit. 
Posner, not Coldwell Banker, should bear the consequences for his failure to 
dutifully pursue his claims, including the consequences for his failure to timely 
designate Mr. Froerer. 
Trial courts are given broad discretion regarding the imposition of discovery 
sanctions because trial court judges "must deal first hand with the parties and the 
discovery process." Coxey v. Fraternal Order of the Eagles, Aerie. 112P.3d 1244, 
1246 (Utah App. 2005). This Court recognizes that a trial court "has great latitude 
in determining the most efficient and fair manner to conduct the court's business 
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[including] discretion in determining whether a violation of a scheduling order 
warrants sanction." Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 174 P.3d 1, 7-8 
(Utah App. 2007). 
Once the threshold determination is made (willfulness, bad faith, fault or 
persistent dilatory tactics), "sanctions are warranted, and the choice of sanctions 
is the responsibility of the trial judge." Aurora Credit Services, Inc., 129 P.3d at 
291. See also Tuck, 981 P.2d at 412. The trial court has "broad discretion to 
select among the full range of options in deciding which sanction to apply to the 
violator." SFR, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 177 P.3d 629, 633 (Utah App. 2008). 
Utah law is clear that, once the factual finding has been made, an appellate 
court may not interfere with the trial court's discretion and disturb the sanction 
"unless abuse of discretion is clearly shown." Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement 
Inc., 199 P.3d at 965. "A trial court's abuse of discretion in selecting which 
sanction to impose may be shown only if there is either an erroneous conclusion 
of law or no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling." Tuck, 981 P.2d at 411 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). There was no erroneous conclusion of 
law and there is much evidence, as described herein, to support the trial court's 
ruling. The sanction was just considering Posner's wilful mishandling of this case 
and the prejudice both Coldwell Banker and the trial court would have suffered if 
the tardy designation was allowed. 
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F. Posner Failed to Marshall the Evidence Supporting the Trial 
Court's Striking of Posner's Expert Designation and Report. 
To successfully challenge the trial court's findings, Posner must 
demonstrate that the findings were clearly erroneous. To make such a showing, 
Posner "must marshal all of the evidence supporting the finding and then 
demonstrate how this evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
finding, is insufficient to support it." Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Utah 
App. 1995). See also Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah App. 1998). 
Posner failed to marshal all of the evidence presented to the trial court that 
supports the factual findings. Among other evidence identified herein, Posner 
failed to advise this Court that the case had been pending for two years and that the 
scheduling order had been amended two times. R. 91 and 872. Posner does not 
address his discovery responses which made no mention of Mr. Froerer. Posner 
further neglected to address his failure to supplement his discovery responses and 
identify Mr. Froerer. R. 728. Because Posner failed to meet his burden to marshal 
all of the evidence, this Court must affirm the trial court's factual findings. Id. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED COLDWELL 
BANKER SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS POSNER COULD NOT 
PREVAIL AT TRIAL WITHOUT EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
Posner brought a claim against Coldwell Banker for breach of fiduciary 
duty. R. 323. To prevail on such a claim, Posner would have to establish both: 1) 
the appropriate standard of care which should have been fulfilled by a reasonable 
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agent/broker at all times material to the subject closing; and 2) that the conduct of 
Coldwell Banker's agent, Ms. Kristoffersen, fell below the applicable standard of 
care. Posner could not satisfy these required elements of his claim without the 
testimony of an expert witness. Without expert testimony Posner's claims failed 
as a matter of law. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted Coldwell Banker's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the case. R. 1842. 
"Utah courts have held that expert testimony may be helpful, and in some 
cases necessary, in establishing the standard of care required in cases dealing with 
the duties owed by a particular profession." Preston & Chambers, P.C., 943 P.2d 
at 263 (citing to Wvcalis v. Guardian Title. 780 P.2d 821, 826 n. 8 (Utah App. 
1989)). "Expert testimony is required '[w]here the average person has little 
understanding of the duties owed by particular trades or professions,' " Id. 
"[Ejxpert testimony has been required to establish the standard of care for medical 
doctors, engineers, insurance brokers, and professional estate executors." Wvcalis, 
supra at n. 8 (internal citations omitted). Expert testimony is only unnecessary 
where the propriety of the defendant's conduct "is within the common knowledge 
and experience of the layman[,]" and 'where misconduct 'is so obvious that no 
reasonable juror could not comprehend the [ ] breach of duty." Preston, 943 P.2d 
at 263-64 (internal citations omitted). 
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In this case, expert testimony was absolutely necessary as the subject matter 
of Posner's claim against Coldwell Banker is not within the common knowledge 
or experience of the layman and there is no obvious misconduct. This is not a case 
where the agent's conduct so obviously departed from a widely recognized 
standard of care that it rendered expert testimony unnecessary. Coldwell Banker 
recognizes that there are times when an expert's opinion may not be necessary to 
establish the standard of reasonable care or a licensee's departure from that 
standard such as an agent's concealment of a latent defect in real property, an 
agent's failure to attend a closing or an agent's acceptance of a double commission. 
These are all examples of acts so obvious that any reasonable layman would know 
that the licensee fell short of a commonly known standard of care and breached 
fiduciary duties owed to his or her client. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Held that Posner's Claims Required 
Expert Testimony to Determine the Appropriate Standard of 
Care to be Applied to Coldwell Banker. 
Here, the propriety of Coldwell Banker's conduct in the transaction at issue 
is not within the common knowledge or experience of a layman. Posner's 
allegation of misconduct against Coldwell Banker deals with a narrow and isolated 
point in time in the subject real estate transaction, to wit, the closing. Furthermore, 
the closing in the subject transaction radically departed from the "standard" or 
"typical" land deal in several material respects; a) Posner was taking a 
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subordinated carry-back interest in the ground; b) Posner's attorney required a 
"surety bond" to secure Posner's position, but neither Posner nor his attorney 
provided any instruction whatsoever as to what the surety bond should entail or 
whether anyone should review it prior to closing; c) Posner signed all of the 
closing documents in advance of the buyer's closing and left them in escrow with 
Equity Title with instructions to Equity to close the transaction upon receipt of the 
Surety Bond; d) Posner received notice that the Surety Bond was completed, prior 
to the buyer's closing, but never requested to review it or have it reviewed by his 
attorney; and e) both Equity Title and Coldwell Banker received the surety bond 
which was simply captioned as a "financial guarantee" instead of as a "surety 
bond." 
The trial court record contained absolutely no evidence whatsoever to 
establish the appropriate standard of care or course of action for a real estate agent 
faced with the unique and highly unusual transaction. Indeed, Posner cannot argue 
in good faith, that this transaction with its several abnormalities and exigencies fell 
"within the common knowledge and experience of the layman." Further, an expert 
was also needed to provide context and application to the juror for otherwise 
abstract fiduciary duties of loyalty, confidentiality, obedience, etc. An expert is 
necessary to explain what, in terms of practical application, context and actual 
behavior, is reasonably expected of an agent/broker who owes fiduciary duties to 
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his principal. Utah law is clear that Posner cannot simply pass the responsibility 
of determining the appropriate standard of care in a situation as unique as this case 
to the lay juror. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Held that Posner's Claims Required 
Expert Testimony to Determine Whether Coldwell Banker's 
Conduct Fell Short of the Applicable Standard of Care and 
Whether Coldwell Banker Breached any Fiduciary Duty Owed 
to Posner. 
Even if Posner was able to establish the appropriate standard of care to be 
applied to Coldwell Banker during the subject closing, expert testimony would still 
be necessary to determine whether Coldwell Banker's purported actions or 
inactions fell short of that standard. To reiterate, expert testimony is only 
unnecessary where misconduct 'is so obvious that no reasonable juror could not 
comprehend the [ ] breach of duty." Preston, 943 P.2d at 263-64. In the case at 
bar, and even taking Posner's allegations at face value, there is no Coldwell Banker 
action which is so egregious and so obvious that no reasonable juror could not 
comprehend that a duty was breached. Reasonable minds could clearly differ on 
whether there was any breach of duty based upon the allegations and evidence 
surrounding this unique closing. 
Even Posner admitted that "reasonable minds could differ as to whether 
Posner's real estate agent's conduct amounted to fiduciary breach " R. 1786. 
By this admission, Posner essentially concedes that the purported misconduct was 
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not so obvious as to clearly constitute a breach of duty. Expert testimony is 
necessary to guide the trier of fact in adj udicating the propriety of Coldwell 
Banker's conduct in this case. Again, an expert is necessary both to establish the 
appropriate standard of care and to opine as to whether there was any breach 
thereof. 
Posner was obviously aware of the need of an expert in this case, which is 
why he designated Mr. Froerer. R. 1066. Indeed, Posner selected Mr. Froerer 
specifically because Mr. Froerer had enough transactional and practical real estate 
experience to address the several unique characteristics of this particular 
transaction. Mr. Froerer was likely selected because Posner believed he had 
sufficient experience to address the numerous and complicated issues of surety 
ship, laws regulating surety ship, contract interpretation, escrow procedures and the 
standard of care for real estate agents as it relates to agents' roles as necessary just 
to establish the standard of care alone. 
There is simply no possible way a lay juror can be expected to have the 
necessary knowledge and experience of an expert in this case. There is similarly 
no possible way that a lay juror without that requisite knowledge and experience 
can determine what the appropriate standard of care was, and to then further 
determine whether Coldwell Banker's conduct satisfied that standard. 
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The e:is -^- • . i are neither legally nor factually analogous 
lo ibis mat'.Li*. (App. iir PP 34-35, citing Reese v. Harper, 3 » l\jd -J 10 11 'uh 
- ;Q and Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876 i 
i>e .u e nothing like the straightforward fact patterns presented in the 
cases cited by POSIHT 1 \a\ n • inwiispuleil thai the circumstances surrounding 
the closing at issue were extremely unusual :• *-> ••••* i^ng. 1 he surety 
boi id, split closing, seller carryback financing, buyer's out of state locatioi i and 
pirn i al ure >it?/iaUiiv in id escrow oi ail closing documents all materially contributed 
to the complexity of Iho iniiisacimii In im ua> could tins closing be ascribed to 
being "within the common knowledge and e\ne* MMI Again, an 
expert is necessary to evaluate and analyze the unique characteristics oi tin M r ^ t 
i losing iind imparl lu iln: uier ol lati what a reasonable agent/broker should have 
done in such a situation so th >| ill. in. r . .1 (act could determine whether Coldwell 
Banker's conduct satisfied that standard. Wuho •..*. 
, •; ropriate standard of care, Posner could not prove that Coldwell Banker's 
condui, 1 fell I'II i<ns ii 
Referring to this particular si I nation, the trial u i n t judge properly noted the 
"complexity and the unusual nature of the transaction and cio>mg a; 
1!' I I /Veconliiii'l),, Hie trial court, properly granted Coldwell Banker's Second 
Motion for St *- .. i.^nn^Ld Poller's case finding that Posner 
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needed an expert to establish the standard of care to be applied to Coldwell Banker 
and to assist the trier of fact in determining whether Coldwell Banker's conduct 
satisfied or fell below the applicable standard. R. 1842. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED COLDWELL 
BANKER ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO 
POSNER'S CONTRACT WITH COLDWELL BANKER. 
Under Utah law, attorney fees are generally not recoverable unless provided 
under statute or by contract. See Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 
419 (Utah 1989). Posner's First Amended Complaint states a claim against 
Coldwell Banker for breach of fiduciary duty. R. 323. It is clear that the fiduciary 
duties owed to Posner by Coldwell Banker arose from that certain Listing 
Agreement executed by and among them. (App. Br., Add. C). The Listing 
Agreement is clearly a contract between Posner and Coldwell Banker. Paragraph 
8 of the Listing Agreement states: 
Except as provided in section 7 [mediation provision], in case of the 
employment of an attorney in any matter arising out of this Listing Agreement 
(including the sale of the Property) the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
receive from the other party all costs etnd reasonable attorney fees, whether the 
matter is resolved through court action or otherwise. 
(App. Br., Add. C). 
While Posner claims that he chose a tort action, there is no denying that the lawsuit 
and the claims articulated therein arose out of the Listing Agreement. The Listing 
Agreement clearly maintains that the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive costs and 
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fees "in case of (lio oni|ilu\ IIKIII ui an attorney in any matter arising out of this Listing 
Agreement." ((Emphasis added) App. ^ M : u Lourt properly 
found that Coldwell Banker was entitled to an award oi its attornexs f •< * 
.. i^ung Agreement. 
While a I "i.*h n-.! .-^ t -< h, >. , .»s Cs a statutory duty to the public to be honest, 
ethical and competent, fiduciary duties inure >oli l\ pin i^.ml i< milratJual agency 
relationships. See Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235 (Utah 2002). Posner -; y 
c M*i( ^  •' ^ ung Agreement with Coldwell Banker, pursuant to which a fiduciary 
relationship was created and fu\\n lai \ Jnlies owed b\ Coldwell Banker to Posner inured. 
It is the Listing Agreement which spells out theM r>... . \.;, r^ 
1'he Listing Agreement is the proverbial '"but for" cause. But for the Listing Agreement, 
iiiciary relationship and no fiduciary duties owed by Coldwell 
Banker to Posner. 
Indeed, paragraph twelve of Posner's Fir ' v . - <•*«• expressly 
iiLMiowledged that the agencx relationship and resulting fiduciary duties owed by 
Luiuv n R? - .. -v : . .eii} i rom the Listing Agreement. Paragraph twelve 
reads in relevant part that "Coidw^ U ' : , . . : - >
 ; , hristofferson 
became Posner's real estate agent K. _-_J. Absent uic Lining A .T-V: ' olde il 
lijnkci would owe no fiduciary duties to Posner. 
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While the contractual origin of Coldwell Banker's fiduciary duties did not foreclose 
Posner from making a claim in tort, it does not allow Posner to ignore the contract's 
existence or escape the applicability of its terms. Contrary to Posner's assertion, Posner 
may not simply choose to sue in tort and not be governed by the terms of the Listing 
Agreement. The Listing Agreement is clearly an enforceable contract between Posner and 
Coldwell Banker and is binding upon both of them. 
This lawsuit clearly arose out of the Listing Agreement and Posner's retention of 
Coldwell Banker as his agent/broker. Accordingly, Coldwell Banker was entitled to an 
award of its attorneys fees and costs pursuant to the Listing Agreement. The trial court 
did not error in awarding Coldwell Banker its attorneys fees and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The necessary evidentiary basis existed to warrant the sanction as evidenced by the 
record below. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking the expert report as 
Posner was at fault and his failure to comply with the Amended Scheduling Order was 
willful. Posner could not have prevailed, as a matter of law, without the testimony of an 
expert witness given the complexities of the case. In addition, the trial court properly 
awarded Coldwell Banker its attorney's fees as the parties interaction arose only from the 
contract between the parties. 
Accordingly, Coldwell Banker respectfully requests this Court to affirm the trial 
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Coldwell Banker. 
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